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Abstract: Much of the literature related to the skimming or cropping of students by charter schools 
has ignored special education students. This article examines the relationship between the severity of 
student disabilities and their likelihood of having attended an Arizona charter school in the 2002-
2003 school year. After adjusting for student traits, local education agency characteristics, and the 
mix of available special education services, a multilevel logistic regression analysis suggests that 
students who had more severe and thus more expensive disabilities were less likely to attend an 
Arizona charter school. Findings from an ancillary set of hierarchical linear models suggested that 
special education students enrolled in charter schools were less expensive on average than similar 
traditional public-school special education students.  
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Costos altos: Severidad de la discapacidad y asistencia en las escuelas charter de en Arizona   
Resumen: La mayor parte de la literatura relacionada con el reclutamiento de los “mejores” 
estudiantes (en inglés skimming or cropping) por las escuelas charters pasa por alto a los estudiantes 
de educación especial. Este artículo examina la relación entre la gravedad de las deficiencias de los 
alumnos y las posibilidades de haber asistido a escuelas charters en Arizona en el año escolar 2002-
2003. Después de ajustar por los atributos de los estudiantes, las características de las agencias de 
educación locales y la combinación de servicios especiales, un análisis logístico multinivel de 
regresión sugiere que los estudiantes que tienen discapacidades más graves y por ende más caros 
eran menos propensos a asistir a una escuela "charter" en Arizona. Los resultados de un grupo de 
apoyo de modelos jerárquicos lineales indicaron que los estudiantes de educación especial inscritos 
en escuelas "charter" cuestan menos que el promedio de los estudiantes en educación especial de las 
escuelas públicas.   
Palabras clave: elección de escuela; escuelas charter; educación especial; gravedad (de 
discapacidad); financiamiento escolar; política educativa.    
 
Altos custos: gravidade da deficiência e presença nas escolas Charter no Arizona   
Resumen: La maior parte da literatura relacionada a seletividade “dos melhores” (em inglês 
conhecido como skimming ou cropping) de alunos pelas charter-schools ignora a educação especial 
de alunos. Este artigo examina a relação entre o grau de severidade das deficiências do aluno e suas 
chances de terem cursado uma charter schhol no Arizona no ano escolar de 2002-2003. Após o 
ajuste dos atributos do aluno, características do órgão educacional local e a mistura de serviços 
especiais disponíveis, uma análise logística de regressão multinível sugere que os alunos que possuem 
deficiências mais graves e mais caras tiveram menos chances de cursarem uma charter school no 
Arizona. Os resultados a partir de um grupo de apoio de modelos hierárquicos lineares indicaram 
que alunos de educação especial matriculados nas charter schools custavam menos em média do que 
os alunos de escolas públicas de educação especial similares.   
Palavras-chave: escolha escolar; escolas chater; educação especial; gravidade (da deficiência); 
finança escolar; política educacional.    
Introduction 
Empirical research on the effects of school choice policy has most frequently compared the 
outputs of charter and private schools to traditional public schools (TPS) or searched for evidence 
suggesting that racial, ethnic and economic segregation, concentration, or stratification has increased 
as the result of the implementation of these policies (Angrist, Bettinger, Bloom, King, & Cremer,  
2002; Braun, Jenkins, & Griggs, 2006; Cobb & Glass, 1999; Dee, 1998; Dee & Fu, 2004; Hoxby, 
1994, 1996, 2000; Lopez, Wells, & Holme, 2002; Lubienski & Lubienski, 2006a, 2006b;  Perie, 
Vandemann, & Goldstein, 2005; Wells, Artiles, Carnochan, Grutzik, Jellison, et al., 1998; Yancey, 
2000). While the debate about the effects of school choice is contentious, greater attention has been 
given to “skimming” or “cropping” of students in charter schools (Buckley & Schneider, 2005; Dee 
& Fu, 2004; Lacierno-Paquet, Holyoke, Moser, & Henig, 2002) with racial, ethnic, or social 
backgrounds that are considered proxies for more capable students who are easier to educate. 
Ironically, much of the skimming literature has largely glossed over the pertinence of the matter with 
respect to special education students. Recent studies conducted by Buckley and Schneider (2005) 
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and Lacierno-Paquet et al. (2002) are unique in that they compare the distribution of special 
education students enrolled in Washington D.C. charter schools to the D.C. TPSs. Perhaps what is 
most striking about these recent local studies as well as other national studies examining 
disproportionality in special education charter school student enrollments is; few if any account for 
differences in disability type e.g., Buckley and Schneider (2005), or they fail to account for disability 
severity within general categories (e.g., Guarino & Chau, 2003). Studies in the special education 
literature often consider disability type and severity to be the most salient dimensions charter 
schools officials use to selectively admit or thwart the enrollment of special education students 
(Howe & Welner, 2002; McKinney, 1996; Welner & Howe, 2005; Zollers & Ramanathan, 1998). 
This article directly addresses the matter of disability severity and the association that it has with 
charter school enrollments within and between disability categories.  In this study, two research 
questions were addressed. First, how is specific disability related to charter school attendance? In 
addition, does disability severity within special education categories decrease the likelihood of 
charter school attendance?  
Between disability group differences were examined to ascertain which groups of special 
education students had the lowest probability of attending a charter school. Focus was then shifted 
to within disability group differences where the log odds of charter school attendance were regressed 
on an expense measure of disability severity for each student. Both sets of analyses suggested that 
students who had more severe and more expensive disabilities were less likely to attend an Arizona 
public charter school in the 2002-2003 school year.   
While parental preference for TPS district special education services or a different but more 
inexpensive mix of charter school services might be offered as alternative explanations for these 
findings, advocates for students with disabilities have frequently argued that charter schools have 
little incentive to educate students with the most severe disabilities. Such students are not only more 
expensive but they are more likely to perform poorly on standardized achievement tests that have 
become the cornerstone of state and federal school accountability systems (Howe & Welner, 2002; 
McKinney, 1996). Additionally, many charter schools are not equipped or staffed to properly offer 
services to the most severely disabled students (Estes, 2004). Heubert (1997) expressed concern that 
federal disability law had loopholes that could potentially be exploited by charter schools to block 
the enrollment of special education students who could not meet the respective entrance 
requirements. These early concerns, coupled with national level charter school statistics showed that 
a disproportionate share of special education students were enrolled in TPSs (Medler & Nathan, 
1995). This led several researchers including Garn (2000) and McKinney (1996) to look more closely 
at the impact of disability severity on charter school enrollments of special education students in 
Arizona. 
The state of Arizona was unique as an early adopter of school choice providing a natural 
setting for the study of the relationship between special education and school choice policy. The 
state implemented choice via charter schools and individual income tax credits for school grant 
donations and private school tuition in 1994 as an alternative to several failed tuition voucher drives 
(Garn, 1999; Timmons-Brown & Hess, 1999). Throughout the early 1990s four school voucher 
plans were proposed but repeatedly rejected by the Arizona state legislature. Interestingly, as recently 
as March of 2005, a fifth voucher proposal was put before the Arizona senate which narrowly 
approved the measure but was ultimately turned down by state congressmen. 
This research used three sources of data obtained from the Arizona Department of 
Education (ADE), in conjunction including the following: administrative data with counts of 
students in twelve disability categories and twelve special education service categories, district 
finance data that contained total actual special education expenditures in each of the twelve disability 
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categories and total funds budgeted to each LEA’s special education program, and testing data from 
the 2002-2003 Arizona’s Instrument to Measure Standards (AIMS). The AIMS test was designed to 
assess student proficiency on standards set by the state in the content areas of math, reading, and 
writing; however, test administrators routinely collected information on students’ demographic and 
social characteristics (gender, race/ethnicity, poverty status, mobility status, English proficiency 
status) and information on their specific types of disabilities. Student-level test data were matched to 
corresponding special education expenditure and student disability count data. Count and 
expenditure data were then combined to develop an expense measure of individual disability 
severity. 
Charter Schools and Students with Disabilities 
Goldhaber and Eide (2003) have recently argued that “there is little evidence on possible 
heterogeneous effects of school choice policies” (p. 229).  Although this comment was made in the 
context of private schooling and the differential effects that might occur at various points in the 
distribution of the student population, it aptly applies to student disability and the limited attention 
the issue has received in the policy arena. The literature on students with disabilities who attend 
charter schools is mainly comprised of studies and reports issued by federal and state governments 
(Ahearn, 1999; 2001; Fiore, Harwell, Blackorby, & Finnigan, 2000; Medler & Nathan, 1995; Nelson 
et al., 2000; Riley, McGuire, & Conaty., 1998; U.S. Department of Education 2000), policy-oriented 
institutes (Bierlein & Fulton, 1996; Corwin & Flaherty, 1995; Guarino & Chau, 2003; Vanourek, 
Manno, Finn, & Bierlein., 1997), and a scant number of articles in peer-reviewed journals. 
A report on a nationally unrepresentative group of thirty-five charter schools claimed that 
special education students were overrepresented in the schools they surveyed (Vanourek et al., 
1997). When compared to a national figure of 10.4% in TPSs they estimated that 12.6% of the 
students enrolled in charter schools had disabilities, 7.7% had a formal individualized education plan 
(IEP), 3.5% “probably” had one in their former public school, and 1.4% had other serious learning 
impediments. But the report had no way of accounting for the effect of disability severity since the 
authors relied on the presence or likely presence of an IEP to identify whether a student had a 
disability in the first place. 
Buckley and Schneider (2005) estimated a set of 95% highest posterior density (HPD) 
intervals for a sample of Washington, D.C., charter schools.  They found that 5 of the 37 D.C. 
charter schools in their study had a larger proportion of special-education students enrolled than the 
average District TPS. Twenty-four of the charter schools served a smaller proportion of special 
education students, while eight had statistically identical enrollments. However, once all charter 
school data were considered, Buckley and Schneider concluded that the D.C. TPS point estimate 
was within the overall charter school HPD interval. This suggested from a statistical standpoint, 
D.C. charters enrolled the same proportion of special education students as the D.C. TPSs. 
In contrast, a sample of California charter schools matched to TPSs suggested that the 
percentage of students with an IEP or a severe disability was not statistically different (Guarino & 
Chau, 2003). However, this finding was not robust. When two charter schools that focused 
exclusively on students with disabilities were removed from the analysis the matched group of TPS 
students had a higher and statistically significant percentage of students with an IEP.3 Interestingly, 
                                                
3 Students from the Arizona School for the Deaf and Blind, a set of TPSs that exclusively serve students 
with disabilities, were excluded from all analyses because these schools did not submit expenditure data. No 
other LEA in the state of Arizona exclusively served special education students. 
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they also found that conversion charter schools (those that had been TPSs previously) when 
compared to start-up charter schools and TPSs had a greater and statistically different percentage of 
students with an IEP or a severe disability. This finding is noteworthy since Lacinero-Paquet et al. 
(2002) found a similar difference in special education enrollments between charter schools they had 
classified as non-market and market oriented. Both sets of authors explicitly (Lacinero-Paquet et al.) 
or implicitly (Guarino & Chau) proposed that the aggregate pattern of charter school special 
education enrollments masked what was happening between different types of charter schools. 
While Lacinero-Paquet et al. suggested that the degree to which a charter school was market 
oriented was the salient factor, Guarino and Chau speculated that cost or a hesitation to give 
marginal students an IEP for fear of labeling them could be possible explanations for the 
differences. Guarino and Chau could not test either hypothesis. 
Another recent study of 22 states suggested that charter schools across the nation typically 
enrolled a lower proportion of special education students than TPSs (U.S. Department of 
Education, 2000). Unfortunately, the study did not look at the issue of between-disability category 
differences in charter school enrollments. In another study, Fiore et al. (2000) sampled 32 charter 
schools in fifteen states from a larger 1997 nationally-representative sample and concluded that 
enrollment of students with mild disabilities was common. But it was unusual to find students with 
more significant disabilities enrolled in charter schools unless the school was specifically designed to 
serve them. The study did not address the impact that disability severity had on enrollments within 
specific disability categories. Nor did it make enrollment comparisons between charter schools and 
TPSs. 
Welner and Howe (2005) and Heubert (1997) have argued that charter schools may be able 
to impede the enrollment of special education students by narrowly defining the educational mission 
of the school. This makes it improbable or impossible for some special education students to meet 
the demands of the curriculum. Heubert (1997) also suggested that existing federal disability 
legislation does not prevent public schools from using selective admission practices so long as the 
admission criteria are necessary for the implementation of the service, program, or activity. He also 
speculated that this would probably allow some charter schools to exclude special education 
students and avoid legal repercussions. In Arizona specifically, McKinney (1996) concluded that 
students with disabilities did not have equal access to charter schools after surveying charter school 
principals and staff as well as ADE representatives. In discussions with officials from both groups, it 
became apparent in several cases that special education students were not being served properly or 
were potentially being denied admission to a charter school because of the cost associated with their 
disability. 
Other studies in states including Massachusetts and Texas suggested that Arizona was not 
unique. Zollers and Ramanathan (1998) uncovered several cases where special education students 
were removed from a charter school when their disabilities were discovered.  In a limited set of 
interviews with Texas charter school officials, Estes (2004) found no direct evidence of 
discrimination; however, some charter schools could not be accessed by wheelchairs and a general 
lack of expertise and understanding of special education and disability law was common. This in 
turn, was likely to affect service provision to these students. 
Howe and Welner (2002) have also suggested that pressure to perform on achievement tests 
could be a motivating factor for exclusionary enrollment practices in charter schools especially since 
increasing aggregate achievement test scores is currently considered the primary indicator of a 
school’s success. State and federal school accountability systems provide a disincentive for schools 
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to enroll low scoring students. As suggested earlier, some charter schools that are formed around an 
academically driven mission might be able to exploit existing loopholes in disability legislation and 
impede or prevent students with disabilities from enrolling. 
Each study in its own right is informative since most have suggested a level of disparity in 
national aggregate enrollments of special education students in charter schools. Some have narrowed 
the scope and shown disparities between charter school types at a local or statewide level. Others 
have shown that there are differences in special education enrollments in different types of charter 
schools. However, most studies fall short of addressing the more nuanced matter of the relationship 
that within and between group disability severity is likely to have with respect to charter school 
enrollment. Even though some of the peer-reviewed studies have produced evidence to substantiate 
these claims, most were based on small-scale, qualitative studies, making it difficult to assess wider 
generalizability of the findings (Howe & Welner, 2002; McKinney, 1996; Zollers & Ramanathan, 
1998). The finding that non-market orientated and conversion charter schools enrolled greater 
proportions of special education students than market oriented and start-up charter schools 
indicated that structural and organizational characteristics of charter schools made a difference in 
student level outcomes. However, these findings tell us little about what types of special education 
students are actually enrolled in charter schools. It is possible that enrollments are tied to disability 
severity and high expense even in non-market charters or in charter schools designed to serve 
special education students more specifically. Clearly, looking beyond proportional enrollments of 
special education students is necessary to better understand the effects that school choice policy has 
on this group of students. If high expense has motivated some or most charter schools to limit or 
prevent the entrance of certain types of students with disabilities, a coherent strategy includes 
examining the relationship between a student’s expense and the log odds of charter school 
attendance. 
Data and Methods 
Student-level data from the 2003 AIMS mathematics test, matched to LEA enrollments, 
LEA special education service use data, and special education finance administrative data were used 
to investigate how specific disability and disability severity were related to charter school attendance. 
Special education students took the mathematics portion of the AIMS test in greater numbers than 
either the reading or writing domains. The AIMS test was a criterion-referenced instrument designed 
to assess student proficiency in the academic content standards set by the state of Arizona. The test 
was administered to all school aged children in the third, fifth, and eighth grades as well as high 
school in mathematics, reading, and writing. Until recently, students were required by state statute to 
take the AIMS test. Students currently take a dual-purpose assessment (the Terra Nova). 
Special education student test records were selected from the main data file based on the 
following criteria: the child had been identified as a special education student, a specific disability 
category had been indicated, or the student had received a Braille or large print exam.  The final data 
set also included the following: the student’s racial/ethnic background; gender; specific disability 
category (speech impairment, learning disability and emotional disability), an indicator of severe 
disability (i.e., if the student was autistic, had a brain injury, was mentally retarded,  had multiple 
disabilities or multiple severe disabilities with sensory impairment, had a visual impairment, or had 
an orthopedic disability), some other health impairment, or a hearing impairment; a limited English 
proficiency (LEP) indicator; a proxy for poverty status (whether Title 1 money was disbursed on 
behalf of the student); whether the student was an out-of-level test taker; the average daily 
membership (ADM) of the LEA; whether the LEA was located in a rural or urban county; the 
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student’s enrollment status in a charter or TPS district; and a measure of the total special education 
expense of serving each student based on his/her specific mix of disabilities. Models also included a 
set of service type variables to control for differing LEA special education services mixes.  
Additional detail is given in Appendix A regarding construction of the independent and dependent 
variables. 
 
Special Education Expense-Disability Severity Measure 
The Arizona Department of Education (ADE) computes a per-pupil expenditure measure in 
each TPS district and for each charter school annually. This measure is the LEA’s reported total 
expenditures in a given fiscal year divided by the LEA’s average daily membership (ADM). 
Expenditure data are reported at the district level, however, for charters the figures are usually 
reported at the school level. Funds allocated to five categories are reported to the public: classroom 
instruction excluding classroom supplies, classroom supplies, district and school administrative 
costs, support services-students, and all other support services and operations. A sum of these five 
categories is equivalent to an LEA’s total expenditure.  Enrollment counts are taken on the 40th and 
100th day of the school year. The average of these two counts constitutes a LEA’s ADM. 
Unfortunately, the state per-pupil expenditure measure is not a sensitive proxy for disability severity 
because costs related exclusively to special education students are not demarcated. Instead, more 
suitable data were used to construct a disability severity measure. 
Arizona LEAs report budgeted and actual special education expenditures and special 
education student enrollment counts for twelve specific disability categories: speech impairment, 
learning disability, emotional disability, mental retardation, visual impairment, hearing impairment, 
other health impairment, orthopedic impairment, brain injury, multiple disabilities, multiple severe 
disabilities with sensory impairment, and autism. Special education funding in Arizona is primarily 
influenced by student enrollment counts. State statute requires LEAs to submit counts of the total 
number of students enrolled in each specific disability category. The counts are submitted at some 
point in the year, and they may be continuously updated until June, the close of the school fiscal 
year.  LEAs may also revise counts up to three years after their initial submission.4 
Charter schools and districts in Arizona receive an identical weighted amount for students 
with specific disabilities based on guidelines set forth by Arizona Revised Statute 15-943. Students 
with more severe disabilities or a larger number of disabilities are weighted more heavily than 
students with single or milder disabilities. Thus, students who are more severely disabled receive 
greater funding. Interestingly, the state exercised little mandatory oversight of the spending of funds 
for special education. However, the ADE school finance department gives all LEAs the opportunity 
to report the total budgeted and actual funds spent on special education students in each of the 
twelve disability categories. These data are released in the Annual Report of the Superintendent of 
Public Instruction.5 The reported budgeted and actual expenditures include all funds spent within 
special education program 200 and 300 in each disability category by the close of the school fiscal 
year. Program 200 and 300 expenditures include salaries, employee benefits, purchased services, 
supplies, and the following other expenses: instruction, support services student, support services 
instructional staff, support services general administration, support services school administration, 
support services business and central, operations and maintenance of plant services, facilities 
                                                
4 Student count data were obtained from the ADE Exceptional Student Services department. 
5 Budgeted and actual special education expenditure data were obtained from Volume 2 of the Annual 
Report of the Superintendent of Public Instruction for the 2002-2003 fiscal year. 
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acquisition and construction services, debt service, and special education title 8 funding.6 Reported 
funds used under both programs are exclusively tied to costs associated with special education 
students. All TPS district and charter schools in Arizona report program 200 costs while some 
report costs associated with program 300. Program 300 expenditures include any funds given to a 
LEA by the federal government that are associated with the education of students with disabilities 
who are in some way tied to the federal government e.g., children of military personnel. 
The special education expenditure/disability severity measure is a sum of the average 
expenditure per student disability within an LEA. 7 For example, the total special education 
expenditure associated with a student who had a learning and an emotional disability was the sum of 
the two, computed average expenditures for each disability within the LEA they attended. If a 
student was a dual/multi-category student, the student’s total special education expense to the 
district was the summation of multiple mean expenditures. The final special education 
expenditure/disability severity measure for the jth student in the kth LEA can be written as: 
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where i = disability 1 to disability 12,  j = the jth student, k = the kth TPS district/charter 
school, Xi = total actual expenditures in each specific disability category, Ni = the total number 
of student enrollments in each specific disability category, and Bj = 1 if student j had the specific 
disability and 0 otherwise. Students with higher total expenditures were considered to be more 
severely disabled.8 Used in tandem, these two sources of data provide the best estimate of the 
                                                
6 While this measure examines identical special education expenses in each district and charter school, 
charter schools can submit special education expenses under two categories (Facilities Acquisition & 
Construction Services, and Debt Service) that TPS districts report as expenses for students without 
accounting for their disability status.  These categories are infrequently used by charter schools and 
expenditures reported here would tend to inflate the expense of special education students enrolled in 
charters relative to those enrolled in TPS districts. 
7 It was mentioned earlier that LEAs could submit student disability counts continuously, and after 
the close of the fiscal year.  As a result some discrepancies arise between aggregate counts of special 
education student test takers and the LEA submitted counts.  When derived enrollment counts were 
higher in the testing data, these count values were substituted for LEA submitted counts.  This 
strategy was employed so that the final expense/disability severity measure would not produce 
aggregated total expenditure sums that exceeded the actual total amount spent in each district and 
charter school on special education.  Therefore, in some cases the final expense/disability severity 
measure is a downwardly biased estimate of the expense/severity of each special education student 
in schools where the number of special education students tested exceeded the final number that 
was reported to the state by a LEA. 
8 Additionally, the natural log of the weighted final special education expense/disability severity measure 
was also computed for each student j to determine if varying group size had an effect. It can be written as: 
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where i = disability 1 to disability 12, j = the jth student, k = the kth charter school/TPS district, 
i
X  = total 
mean actual expenditures in each specific disability category i, Ni = the total number of student enrollments 
in each specific disability category, and Bj = 1 if student j has the specific disability and 0 otherwise.   The 
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total special education expense associated with each student in each examined district and 
charter school.9  
 
Student Expense: Cause or Consequence? 
One criticism of using student expenditures as a proxy for disability severity is that student 
expense might also be considered a result of the special education services received instead of an 
influence on school enrollment. Endogeneity becomes a concern with respect to this viewpoint.  
Criticism might also be raised regarding the use of student expense as a proxy for disability severity 
based on the fact that the intensity of use of different types of special education services offered in 
average Arizona charter schools and TPS districts were different. Lower average special education 
student expenditures by charter schools could be attributed to the use of different but less costly 
types of special education services. 
Studies in the special education literature suggest that students who have more severe 
disabilities are expensive relative to students with minor disabilities (Guarino & Chau, 2003; 
McKinney, 1996). Such students not only require a wider breadth of services but also services that 
are resource intensive—e.g., separate pullout programs instead of mainstreaming. Empirical 
evidence from California and Arizona show that charter schools typically use different special 
education services with varying levels of intensity.   
Guarino and Chau (2003) found that start-up charter schools in California had a substantially 
different mix of special education services when compared to conversion charter schools or TPSs. A 
higher percentage of start-up charter schools (63.8%) mainstreamed their special education students 
in general education classrooms when compared to conversion charters (20.7%) and TPSs (19.3%). 
They also found that start-up charters only served a very small percentage of their special education 
students (4.1%) in separate pullout programs when compared to conversion charters (38.9%) and 
TPSs (20.1%). They speculated that start-up charters were more heavily reliant on the limited service 
delivery mode of mainstreaming because of constrained finances, limited facilities, or philosophical 
differences about principles of inclusion. Moreover, they could not determine if students were being 
served appropriately or fully. 
In Arizona, there were also differences in the types of services that special education 
students were offered in TPS districts and in charter schools during the 2002-2003 school year. 
Statewide data from the ADE’s ESS (Exceptional Student Services) showed that 18.9% of special 
education students enrolled in charter schools received services in the regular classroom with 
supplemental aids/services. Only 3.1% of TPS district special education students received services in 
                                                                                                                                                       
substantive interpretations of the severity coefficient in all of the logistic regression models remained 
unchanged. However, the absolute value of the coefficient increased in models that used the weighted 
measure. Results for the unweighted expense-disability severity measure are reported since they produce a 
more conservative estimate of the effect. 
9 A supplemental analysis was undertaken to determine if a different expense assumption would alter the 
main substantive findings for students who had multiple disabilities. For students who were dual/multi-
category the expense/disability severity measure was re-calculated using only the expenditure associated with 
the most expensive disability. Results (not shown but available upon request) suggested that the re-calculated 
expenditure/disability severity measure was larger in magnitude in each of the models.  However, the sign of 
the model coefficients was consistently negative and statistically significant in each model except for the other 
disabilities model where the effect was not statistically significant. The results shown in Table 3 present 
findings based on the more conservative expenditure/disability severity measure. A second, ancillary analysis 
was also run where the ln(number of disabilities) each student had was included in each model along with the 
original expense/disability measure. While this coefficient was statistically significant, the estimate of the 
expense/disability severity measure changed little in magnitude.  
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this context. In contrast, 95.1% of TPS district special education students were served at least part-
time in separate pullout programs compared to 79.9% of special education students in charter 
schools. The majority (64.1%) of special education charter school students spent less than 21% of 
the day in a pullout program while 13.4% spent at least 21% but not more than 60% of the day in a 
pullout program. Half of TPS district special education students (50.6%) spent less than 21% of the 
day in a pullout program while nearly a third (32.8%) spent at least 21% but not more than 60% of 
the day in a pullout program. Finally, 11.7% of TPS district students spent more than 60% of their 
day in a pullout program compared to 2.4% of charter school students. 
To address the issue of endogeneity, the first multivariate analysis was run where total 
student expenditures predicted charter school attendance. A second multivariate analysis used total 
student expenditures as an outcome instead. To address any concern about Arizona charter schools 
serving special education students more economically with a different mix of services, both of the 
multivariate analyses included a set of LEA level and special education service mix use intensity 
variables to isolate the effect of different LEA special education service mixes. 
It is possible that a student’s special education expense may be attributed to the services he 
or she received, especially if the mix of services offered by the LEA was standardized. However, it is 
crucial to recognize that a student’s expense may instead be considered the direct result of a 
student’s specific disabilities. The following section provides further discussion on this matter. 
 
IEP Formulation in Arizona 
Federal legal statute mandates that special education service provision be directed by an IEP. 
An IEP is supposed to be developed around a student’s specific needs. If a LEA rigidly adheres to 
the IEP process, a special education student’s cost to the LEA cannot be directly determined by the 
LEA. Rather, a student’s disability type and the severity of the disability jointly determine the types 
of service they receive. 
To receive special education services in Arizona, a student must first have an IEP developed. 
The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) stipulates that parents, the student’s regular 
and special education teachers, a district representative, an academic evaluation interpreter, a 
transition services representative, and even the child (if he or she is old enough to understand and 
contribute) must participate in the formulation of the IEP. The IEP identifies and addresses each 
child’s unique educational needs in an environment that is least restrictive to learning. The IEP must 
minimally include: what, where, and how long special education services will be provided; the child’s 
annual academic, social, or behavioral goals; how the child’s progress will be tracked and how 
parent(s) will be notified of that progress; an assessment of the child’s current performance, which is 
used to decide eligibility for services; modifications or accommodations to be received on 
standardized tests; a statement of the type of special education services to be received and the 
training that those providing the services will have or need to implement them;  a description of the 
extent to which a child may or may not participate with non-disabled children in the regular 
classroom setting; course descriptions required at age 14 or younger to reach post-school goals; (at 
age 16 or younger) transition services required for graduation; and a statement that requires telling a 
student at legal adulthood that certain rights will transfer to him or her. 
Once the IEP has been developed, the parents of the child are required to approve the plan. 
If they do not, the IEP must be renegotiated with the other IEP team members. If an agreement still 
cannot be reached, parents can file a due process complaint with the LEA. The complaint can be 
taken to the state department of education if a resolution is still not reached at the district level. 
Once an IEP has been agreed upon, but before it can be implemented and special education services 
are started, parents must give written permission to the LEA. 
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The initial IEP process has been structured by legal statute so that the child’s unique needs 
should be fully addressed. The IEP formulation and approval process places prescribed 
requirements on the LEA to provide all needed services in the most appropriate settings. It is 
possible that special education services offered at the time of the formulation could be constrained 
by LEA resource and facility limitations, or philosophical practices based on inclusion. However, the 
child’s parent(s) would have to explicitly agree to limited services or a reduction in services if the 
student transferred to a different school district. Parents might also lack resources to advocate for 
their child, or they may simply be unaware and uninformed about their child’s special educational 
needs and their parental rights to contest an IEP that did not fully accommodate their child. 
In summary, this discussion suggests how student expense can be used as a proxy for 
disability severity based on the IEP formulation process. However, given the possibility that student 
expense may also be considered a consequence of services received, additional models that used a 
student’s total special education expense as an outcome were estimated. As mentioned earlier, all 
multivariate analyses included a set of LEA level special education service mix use intensity 
variables. An explanation of these secondary analyses follows a discussion of the main analyses. 
 
Generalized Estimating Equation, Logistic Regression Models and Hypotheses 
 The primary dependent variable for this study was binary making the use of logistic 
regression methods rather than OLS regression methods a statistically appropriate choice. For a 
number of reasons discussed more thoroughly in Menard (1995) and Berry (1993) OLS estimates of 
the probability of charter school attendance would likely be nonsensical—i.e., greater than one and 
negative. In addition, error variance would likely be heteroskedastic.  
The logistic regression models were estimated with a generalized estimating equation (GEE).  
The GEE approach was taken because special education students were nested within 
districts/schools. Usually, residuals are correlated in nested data (Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002). This 
correlation, if ignored, will bias model fit statistics and standard errors, leading to erroneous 
conclusions about the statistical significance of substantive effects. The GEE approach not only 
adjusts the coefficient standard errors but also has the added advantage of producing a solution that 
is consistent and asymptotically normal when correlational structure is misspecified (Diggle et al., 
1994). This feature allowed for the multilevel, logistic regression models to be estimated without 
specifying a covariance structure. Model coefficients are therefore unbiased as are the statistical tests 
on the regression coefficients. 
Charter school attendance is conceptualized as a function of student characteristics, family 
background, LEA characteristics, and the total expense associated with educating specific categories 
of special needs students. The general logit model can be expressed in the following form: 
logit( Yˆ ij) = α + β1X1ij + β 2X2ij  + β 3X3ij+ β 4X4ij + eij 
where the logit( Yˆ ij) is a vector of the predicted log of the odds of charter school attendance for 
the ith student in the jth LEA; X1ij is a vector of student characteristics associated with the ith 
student in the jth LEA; X2ij  is a vector of familial characteristics associated with the ith student 
in the jth LEA;  X3ij is the total expense associated with all of the ith student’s disabilities in the 
jth LEA; X4ij is a vector of LEA characteristics associated with the ith student in the jth LEA; 
and eij is the unique error term associated with the ith student in the jth LEA. A set of six 
logistic regression models were estimated to study between and within-group expense/disability 
severity and the relationship it had to the log odds of charter school attendance. The dependent 
variable was coded such that a “1” corresponded to charter school attendance and a “0” 
indicated TPS district attendance. Two models were estimated for each set of disabilities. The 
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first model excluded the special education service type variables. The second model added these 
variables to hold their effect constant. 
 
Between Group Models 
The between group models were estimated to examine the relative group odds of being 
enrolled in a charter school net of other confounding factors and within-group expense/disability 
severity. These models provide an indication of which general groups of special education students 
were less likely to attend a charter school in Arizona. Students were categorized into one or more of 
the following five student disability categories including emotional disability, speech impairment, 
learning disability, severe disability, and other disabilities. These categories were used because a small 
number of charter school students in several of the individual disability categories necessitated the 
construction of a composite measure of severe disability and other disabilities. Students were 
considered severely disabled if they had one or more of the following impairments/disabilities: 
mental retardation, autism, multiple disabilities, multiple severe disabilities with sensory impairment, 
orthopedic impairment, brain injury, or visual impairment. Students with a hearing impairment or 
some other health impairment were classified as having other disabilities. LEAs that enrolled 
students with a speech impairment, learning, or emotional disabilities received identical weighted 
amounts from the state. Greater funding was given to LEAs for students who had a severe disability 
or some other disability. Students with learning disabilities were used as the contrast group in the 
between group model. If average charter schools were typically unable to accommodate special 
education students who had more severe disabilities there should be differences between the various 
group odds. It was hypothesized that students classified with more serious disabilities (those who 
had a severe disability) would have lower log odds of attending a charter school than students with a 
learning disability. 
 
The Within-group Models 
The within disability group analysis provide estimates of the log odds of charter school 
attendance for students in each general disability group taking into account the specific effect of 
their expense/disability severity.  Separate sets of models were estimated for each of the five 
disability groups.10 If average charter schools limited services to special education students whose 
needs made them more expensive to educate, it could be expected that those students who had the 
most severe and expensive impairments within each general disability category would also have the 
lowest log odds of attending a charter school. 
 
Hierarchical Linear Models 
In addition to the GEE logistic analyses a set of hierarchical linear models (HLM) were also 
estimated where student expense was treated as the dependent variable. This approach was taken to 
address the issue of reverse causality between expense/disability severity and charter school 
attendance.  The within-LEA model estimating the special education expense of the ith student in 
the jth TPS district/charter school for all disabilities can be expressed in the following form: 
Ln(Special Education Expense)ij =  β0 + β1(Femaleij) + β2(Blackij) + β3(Hispanicij) + 
β4(Native Americanij) + β5(Asianij) + β6(Other Ethnicityij) + β7(Poverty Statusij) + β8(LEP 
Statusij) + β9(Out of Level Statusij) +  β10(Mobileij) + β11(Emotional Disabilityij) + β12(Speech 
Impairmentij) + β13(Severe Disabilityij) + β14(Other Disabilityij) + rij 
                                                
10 The model examining the log odds of charter school attendance within the severe disability group 
dropped the asian student category. There were no Asian students with a severe classification. 
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where β0 is the intercept, β1 – β14 are slopes, and rij is unique error associated with the ith student in 
the jth TPS district/charter school.  In each model, β0 is allowed to vary from LEA to LEA and 
represents deviation from the average LEA intercept i.e., u0j.  β0, is a function of the jth TPS 
district/charter school’s characteristics: 
β0j = γ00 + γ01(Ln(ADM)j) + γ02(Urbanj) + γ03(Charter Schoolj) + γ04(% Service Typej) + u0j 
The γ03 coefficient indicates whether student special education expenditures were lower in charter 
schools. The γ04 coefficient represents a set of special education service type variables included to 
account for the differences in the use of the various types of special education services between 
LEAs.  Separate, two-level models were estimated for each of the five disability categories. 
 
Model Control Covariates 
 All GEE logistic regression models and HLMs included a set of control covariates. This set 
of variables included LEP, racial/ethnic, and poverty status primarily because of the precedent set 
by previous research. For example, Artiles et al. (2005) found that students who had LEP were 
referred to special education programs at a higher rate than native English speakers. Several other 
studies have suggested that some ethnic groups, particularly black and Native American students 
were more frequently placed into special educations programs and diagnosed with specific 
disabilities than students from other ethnicities/racial groupings (Goodale & Soden, 1981; Harry & 
Anderson, 1994; Herrera, 1998). How poverty status affects charter school enrollment is still 
ardently contested. Some studies have shown that charter schools enrolled larger proportions of 
poorer students than TPSs, while other studies suggest the converse. 
Another issue that required consideration was the practice of allowing Arizona special 
education students to take the AIMS statewide assessment out of grade level. Many out-of-level test 
takers tended to have more significant disabilities. In addition, charter schools tended to test a larger 
proportion of their students out of level. However, it was impossible to distinguish between the 
legitimate practice and the alleged practice of testing students out of level to invalidate test scores so 
that they would not be included in aggregate level reviews of school performance.  Students were 
included in these analyses irrespective of the validity of their test score. 
All regression models included a school mobility indicator. School mobility is typically 
associated with a variety of negative scholastic consequences including higher dropout rates 
(Rumberger & Larson, 1998), behavioral problems (Simpson & Fowler, 1994), and lower 
achievement test scores (Simpson & Fowler, 1994; Swanson & Schneider, 1999).  
As discussed earlier, final models included the percentage of students who had received 
different types of special education services in the LEA. Nearly 97% of special education students 
received services in one of four mutually exclusive categories including:  service type A—outside the 
regular class less than 21% of the day; service type B—outside the regular class for at least 21% but 
not more than 60% of the day; service type C—outside the regular class for more than 60% of the 
day; and service type S—regular class with supplemental aids/services. Preliminary models were 
estimated with all four service type variables entered as a block. Models shown in the multivariate 
regression tables included only those service type variables that had a statistically significant effect. 
Finally, LEA size (ADM) and location were included in each model because of the potential 
for selection bias that could result from both parental preference for a smaller school environment, 
or a larger service area that could provide a greater number of educational choices in a more 
centralized geographic area. Some parents of students with disabilities might be inclined to seek a 
wider variety of educational services that are more likely to be offered in larger schools and TPS 
districts. These LEAs are more likely to be located in urban areas. Moreover, LEAs situated in urban 
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areas will also be more likely to enroll students with disabilities because of the greater numerical 
concentration of such students in the school or district’s geographic vicinity.   
LEA size functions as a control for economies of scale that larger schools and districts are 
likely to have in terms of offering special education services. An economy of scale makes larger 
LEAs more adept and economically efficient in terms of meeting the needs of a diverse population 
of special education students because of the centralization of resources and educational services.  It 
is also possible that some larger districts with greater budget capacity and larger student populations 
might be able to allow for special education program spending to encroach upon general education 
spending (Chambers et al. 2005, Sugarman 2002).    
Results 
A comparison of group mean proportions shown in Table 1 suggested that the profiles of 
special education students differed in a variety of ways when accounting for their LEA attendance 
status. A larger proportion of special education charter school students were female, white, of 
Native American origin, or of some other ethnicity. They were also more likely than TPS district 
students to have changed schools during the year and to have tested out of level. Not surprisingly, 
charter school students with disabilities attended smaller districts/schools than special needs TPS 
students. 
In contrast, a larger proportion of TPS district special education students were Hispanic or 
had an LEP status. A larger proportion were poor or eligible for Title I funds, and a 
disproportionate number attended schools in more urbanized counties (see Table 1). There was a 
14% difference in the enrollment of poorer special education students, a 15% difference in Hispanic 
student enrollments, and an 11% difference in LEP enrollments. Average special education students 
who attended TPS districts were almost $3000 more expensive than their counterparts who had 
attended average charter schools.  
These sample data, like the state figures discussed earlier, suggest that charter schools were 
more reliant on mainstreaming (type S services) and time restricted pullout programs (type A 
services). TPS districts enrolled much larger proportions of their special education students in time 
intensive pullout programs (type B and C services). Importantly, the overall special education service 
type distribution was remarkably similar when compared to the overall state figures. The sample data 
did show that students who had received type C services were slightly over-represented while those 
who received type A services were slightly under-represented when compared to the state figures. 
Table 2 suggests there were also differences between LEA types in terms of the proportion 
of students enrolled with different types of disabilities. Average TPS districts enrolled a 
disproportionate share of students with a speech impairment or a severe disability when compared 
to average charter schools.  The finding related to the speech impairment category might be 
explained by the large mean differences between TPS district and charter schools in the proportion 
of special education students who were Hispanic or had a LEP status. Such students are referred to 
special education at a higher rate than other students. Additionally, Arizona charter schools enrolled 
a larger proportion of students with emotional disabilities. Finally, results in Table 2 further suggest 
that students who had learning disabilities were the most representative type of special education 
student in both types of LEAs while those classified with other disabilities were least representative. 
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Table 1  
Mean proportions and mean differences between special education students enrolled in charter (n=1,222) and 
TPS districts (n=23,916), 2002-2003  
a p<.01; b p<.0001 
 
Variable 
LEA 
Type 
Mean 
Proportion 
Std. 
Deviation 
Mean 
Difference 
99% C.I. 
Lower     Upper 
TPS 0.33 0.47 Female 
Charter 0.38 0.49 
-0.05b -0.09 -0.01 
TPS 0.07 0.25 Black 
Charter 0.07 0.26 
0.00 -0.03 0.01 
TPS 0.46 0.50 White 
Charter 0.51 0.50 
-0.05a -0.09 -0.01 
TPS 0.36 0.48 Hispanic 
Charter 0.21 0.41 
0.15b 0.13 0.19 
TPS 0.08 0.28 Native American 
Charter 0.15 0.36 
-0.07b -0.09 -0.04 
TPS 0.01 0.10 Asian 
Charter 0.01 0.09 
0.00 -0.01 0.01 
TPS 0.02 0.12 Other Ethnicity 
Charter 0.05 0.22 
-0.03b -0.05 -0.02 
TPS 0.45 0.50 Poverty Status 
Charter 0.31 0.46 
0.14b 0.11 0.18 
TPS 0.15 0.36 LEP 
Charter 0.04 0.19 
0.11b 0.10 0.13 
TPS 0.72 0.45 Urban 
Charter 0.67 0.47 
0.05b 0.01 0.08 
TPS 0.14 0.34 Mobile 
Charter 0.22 0.42 
-0.08b -0.12 -0.05 
TPS 0.43 0.50 Out of level test 
taker Charter 0.55 0.50 
-0.12b -0.15 -0.08 
TPS 968.57 609.41 ADM (district 
size) Charter 285.12 235.81 
683.45b 663.31 703.60 
TPS $4294.97 5080.05 Total Student 
Special Education 
Expense 
Charter $1299.94 2404.66 
$2995.03b $2798.47 $3191.58 
TPS 0.44 0.15 Service Type A 
Charter 0.58 0.39 
-0.14b -0.17 -0.11 
TPS 0.32 0.13 Service Type B 
Charter 0.12 0.23 
0.20b 0.18 0.21 
TPS 0.19 0.10 Service Type C 
Charter 0.06 0.14 
0.13b 0.13 0.15 
TPS 0.02 0.04 Service Type S 
Charter 0.20 0.37 
-0.18b -0.18 -0.20 
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Table 2 
Mean proportions and mean differences between special education students enrolled in charter schools (n=1,222) 
and TPS districts (n=23,916) by specific disability type, 2002-2003 
Disability Type 
LEA 
Type 
Mean 
Proportion 
Std. 
Deviation 
Mean 
Difference 
99% C.I. 
Lower    Upper 
TPS 0.74 0.44 Learning Disability 
Charter 0.76 0.43 
-0.02 -0.05 0.002 
TPS 0.20 0.40 Speech Impairment 
Charter 0.15 0.36 0.05
b 0.02 0.07 
TPS 0.09 0.29 Severe Disability 
Charter 0.06 0.24 0.03
b 0.02 0.05 
TPS 0.08 0.28 Emotional Disability 
Charter 0.11 0.31 -0.03
a -0.04 -0.01 
TPS 0.06 0.25 Other Disability 
Charter 0.07 0.26 -0.01 -0.02 0.01 
a p<.01; b p<.0001 
 
These descriptive results suggest that there were several compositional differences between 
charter and TPS district special education populations. These results could also suggests that 
cropping of special education students in Arizona charter school occurred on several dimensions 
including disability severity, gender, ethnicity, language proficiency, and poverty status. The GEE 
logistic and HLM analyses provide firmer footing for the argument that the majority of charter 
schools in Arizona enrolled special education students whose needs were more in line with their 
budgetary constraints or available services. 
Table 3 shows the results of the between and within-group GEE logistic regression models. 
The between group model estimated the relative log odds of charter school attendance for the five 
general disability categories including learning, speech, severe, emotional, and other disabilities net of 
each student’s total special education expense/disability severity and other personal, family, and 
LEA characteristics. There were several notable findings.  
Relative to students with a learning disability, those who had an emotional or severe disability 
were less likely to have attended a charter school net of their expense to the school (see Model 
1). The respective odds ratios showed that these special education students were 2.16 times less 
likely, and 1.64 times less likely to have attended a charter school when compared to the odds of 
students with a learning disability. These results provide an answer to the first research question 
and give support to the first hypothesis. Students with disabilities who were ranked by the state 
as more severe were less likely to have attended a charter school 
It is also important to note that once the intensity of use of different types of special 
education services was considered, the between group log odds of attending a charter school no 
longer varied (see model 2). The magnitude of the effect of student expense/disability severity 
diminished slightly; however, it remained a statistically significant predictor of charter school 
attendance. This suggests that the LEA special education service mix, or the intensity of service use 
explained between disability group attendance differences. However, the fact that the 
expense/disability severity indicator continued to predict charter school attendance net of the special 
education services that are typically used most intensively in charter schools further suggests that 
student expense can be used as an accurate proxy for disability severity. The odds ratio for this 
coefficient indicates that for a one unit increase in a student’s log total special education expense, the 
log of the odds of charter school attendance decreased by 0.25 units, or the odds decreased by 28% 
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(see model 2).  Clearly, irrespective of disability type, more expensive students were less likely to have 
attended a charter school. The within-group analysis can then determine if this was the case for all of 
the examined categories. 
 
Table 3  
GEE logistic regression models, charter school attendance in Arizona, 2002-2003 
Between    
Group 
Model 1 
Between  
Group 
Model 2 
Learning 
Disability 
Model 1 
Learning 
Disability 
Model 2 
Speech 
Impairment 
Model 1 
Speech 
Impairment 
Model 2 Variable 
β Emp. S.E. 
Odds   
Ratio β 
Emp.
S.E. 
Odds 
Ratio β 
Emp.
S.E. 
Odds 
Ratio β 
Emp.
S.E. 
Odds 
Ratio β 
Emp.
S.E. 
Odds 
Ratio β 
Emp. 
S.E. 
Odds 
Ratio 
Constant 14.49c 1.64 - 8.36c 2.09 - 15.30c 1.87 - 8.92b 2.53 - 18.25c 2.88 - 10.29b 3.25 - 
Female 0.17a 0.15 1.19 0.24 0.16 1.28 0.11 0.16 1.11 0.17 0.16 1.18 -0.23 0.29 0.80 0.02 0.27 1.02 
Black 0.03 0.34 1.03 0.34 0.38 1.41 0.10 0.40 1.11 0.42 0.44 1.52 0.10 0.36 1.10 0.28 0.38 1.33 
Hispanic -0.74b 0.26 0.48 -0.55 0.31 0.58 -0.76a 0.33 0.47 -0.61 0.35 0.55 -1.13b 0.42 0.32 -0.89 0.52 0.41 
Native Amer. 1.22 0.78 3.39 1.69a 0.79 5.43 1.39 0.85 4.01 1.70a 0.82 5.46 -0.21 0.80 0.81 0.14 1.13 1.14 
Asian 0.38 0.35 1.46 0.47 0.40 1.60 -0.08 0.44 0.93 -0.32 0.46 0.72 -0.32 0.66 0.73 -0.50 0.44 0.60 
Other 
Ethnicity 0.29 0.34 1.34 -0.02 0.46 0.98 0.15 0.39 1.17 0.07 0.48 1.07 0.25 1.69 1.29 0.18 1.20 1.20 
Poverty 
Status -0.87
a 0.44 0.42 -0.86 0.57 0.42 -1.05a 0.49 0.35 -0.96 0.61 0.38 -1.17 0.79 0.31 -1.26 0.92 0.28 
LEP -0.69 0.58 0.50 -0.66 0.72 0.52 -0.63 0.68 0.53 -0.56 0.72 0.57 -1.53 0.99 0.22 -0.53 0.88 0.59 
Ln(Dist. 
ADM) -2.54
c 0.30 0.08 -2.33c 0.29 0.10 -2.56c 0.32 0.08 -2.24c 0.32 0.11 -2.77c 0.42 0.06 -2.38c 0.49 0.09 
Urban 
District 1.88
b 0.64 6.56 1.91b 0.67 6.76 1.75b 0.66 5.74 1.57a 0.63 4.78 2.89a 1.24 17.93 2.77a 1.32 16.01 
Out of level 0.32 0.22 1.37 0.40 0.23 1.50 0.34 0.23 1.40 0.45 0.25 1.57 -0.04 0.57 0.96 0.37 0.58 1.45 
Mobile 0.04 0.25 1.05 0.09 0.24 1.09 0.19 0.21 1.21 0.23 0.25 1.26 -0.49 0.58 0.61 -0.62 0.67 0.54 
Ln(Total 
Sped.Exp.) -0.38
c 0.06 0.68 -0.25a 0.05 0.77 -0.46c 0.08 0.63 -0.32c 0.08 0.73 -0.69c 0.15 0.50 -0.62c 0.15 0.54 
% Service    
type A - - - 0.06
b 0.02 1.06 - - - 0.05b 0.02 1.06 - - - 0.08c 0.02 1.08 
% Service    
type S - - - 0.08
c 0.01 1.08 - - - 0.07c 0.01 1.07 - - - - - - 
Emot. 
disability -0.77
a 0.36 0.46 -0.10 0.34 0.90 - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Speech 
impair. 
0.25 0.31 1.29 0.18 0.31 1.20 - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Severe 
disability -0.49
a 0.23 0.61 -0.40 0.27 0.67 - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Other 
disability -0.36 0.45 0.70 0.08 0.46 1.08 - - - - - - - - - - - - 
n 25,138 25,138 18,622 18,622 4,879 4,879 
-2LL 4372.01 3422.44 3276.71 2707.51 661.52 478.46 
Nagelkerke’s 
R2 0.60 0.69 0.61 0.68 0.62 0.73 
a  p≤.05 b  p≤.01 c p≤.0001 
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Table 3 (continued) 
Severe 
Disability 
Model 1 
Severe 
Disability 
Model 2 
Emotional 
Disability 
Model 1 
Emotional 
Disability 
Model 2 
Other  
Disability 
Model 1 
Variable 
β Emp. S.E. 
Odds 
Ratio β 
Emp. 
S.E. 
Odds 
Ratio β 
Emp.
S.E. 
Odds
Ratio β 
Emp. 
S.E. 
Odds 
Ratio β 
Emp.
S.E. 
Odds 
Ratio 
Constant 17.68c 2.81 - 12.33b 4.34 - 13.43c 1.87 - 23.59c 3.87 - 20.38c 4.34 - 
Female 1.03b 0.40 2.80 1.35b 0.46 3.86 1.10b 0.37 3.01 1.31b 0.42 3.71 0.94c 0.29 2.57 
Black -0.21 0.63 0.81 -0.01 0.94 0.99 0.02 0.51 1.02 1.09 0.58 2.97 0.47 0.51 1.60 
Hispanic -1.23a 0.55 0.29 -0.59 0.75 0.55 -1.00a 0.51 0.37 -1.62 1.07 0.20 -1.36a 0.63 0.26 
Native Amer. 0.61 0.92 1.85 1.65 1.03 5.23 -0.63 0.89 0.53 2.02 1.51 7.56 0.71 1.07 2.04 
Asian - - - - - - -2.35a 1.14 0.10 -6.65c 1.55 0.00 1.07b 0.50 2.91 
Other Ethnicity 1.26a 0.63 3.54 0.34 0.85 1.40 0.87a 0.44 2.38 -0.17 0.85 0.85 -0.13 0.96 0.87 
Poverty Status -0.25 0.53 0.78 0.09 0.60 1.10 -0.21 0.50 0.81 -0.79 0.78 0.46 -0.45 0.57 0.64 
LEP -0.59 0.68 0.55 -0.98 0.99 0.38 -0.52 0.69 0.60 -2.31b 0.82 0.10 0.72 0.63 2.06 
Ln(District 
ADM) 
-3.45c 0.50 0.03 -3.33c 0.59 0.04 -2.55c 0.37 0.08 -3.85c 0.64 0.02 -3.95a 0.84 0.02 
Urban District 3.54c 0.87 34.30 3.62b 1.04 37.39 2.08a 0.87 8.00 3.75b 1.16 42.46 3.09a 1.27 21.99 
Out of level 0.19 0.43 1.22 0.61 0.56 1.84 -0.47 0.51 0.63 -0.97 0.66 0.38 0.11 0.36 1.12 
Mobile -0.36 0.69 0.70 -0.94 0.80 0.39 -0.82 0.87 0.44 0.23 0.48 1.26 -0.01 0.68 0.99 
Ln(Total 
Sped.Exp.) 
-0.33c 0.05 0.72 -0.27c 0.07 0.76 -0.30c 0.09 0.74 -0.25b 0.09 0.78 -0.11 0.09 0.89 
% Service         
type A 
- - - 0.06a 0.03 1.06 - - - - - - - - - 
% Service         
type B 
- - - - - - - - - -0.16c 0.04 0.85 - - - 
% Service         
type C 
- - - - - - - - - -0.03 0.02 0.97 - - - 
% Service         
type S 
- - - 0.10c 0.02 1.10 - - - - - - - - - 
n 2,332 2,332 2,109 2,109 1,648 
-2LL 237.93 171.90 288.26 126.23 336.34 
Nagelkerke’s R2 0.68 0.77 0.76 0.90 0.61 
a  p≤.05 b  p≤.01 c p≤.0001 
 
Five sets of within-group models examined the relationship between expense/disability 
severity and the log odds of charter school attendance in Arizona. While there was considerable 
variation in terms of the impact of other covariates on charter school attendance within each 
disability category, the direction of the expense/disability severity coefficient was consistently 
negative in each of the five sets of models. With the exception of the students who had other 
disabilities, all the other within-group analyses included statistically significant expense/disability 
severity coefficients. Beyond this exception, more severely disabled students (i.e., those who were 
more expensive) within each of the other four disability categories were less likely to have attended a 
charter school in the 2002/2003 school year—between 1.28 and 1.86 times less likely once the 
intensity of use of special education services was accounted for.  
Similar to the between groups models, the within-group models show a decrease in the 
magnitude of the effect of higher expense/greater disability severity on charter school attendance 
once relevant service mix variables were included. Most importantly, these findings provide an 
answer to the second research question concerning the impact of disability severity on charter 
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school attendance. They also give support to the corresponding hypothesis in four of the five 
disability categories. 
For reasons discussed earlier, the HLM analyses presented in Table 4 used the natural log of 
student’s total special education expense/disability severity as the dependent variable.  Six sets of 
models were estimated including a set for each of the five disability categories and a set for all 
disabilities. Even though the implied sequence of causation has been reversed in these models, 
substantive interpretation regarding student expense was nearly analogous to that of the GEE 
logistic regression analysis. Net of student characteristics, other LEA characteristics, and the 
intensive use of different types of special education services, charter school students were on 
average less expensive than their respective peers. The charter school coefficient was negative and 
statistically significant in each main effects model. Importantly, moderately large to large ICCs (.54 
to .96) suggested that over half to almost all of the variability in the expense of average special 
education students occurred between LEAs (see all models). This suggested that the use of a multilevel 
model to account for clustered data was methodologically appropriate.  
In summary, students with more severe disabilities who were enrolled in charter schools 
were on average less expensive than those students enrolled in TPS districts. It is also important to 
point out that like the GEE logistic analyses, the magnitude of the charter school coefficient in each 
set of HLM models decreased slightly once the intensity of use of special education services was 
accounted for in each set of models.11 This finding suggested that the intensive use of certain types 
of special education services explains some of the expense differential between LEA types. 
However, most of the differential is still present even after service mix use intensity was considered.  
The GEE logistic and HLM results jointly suggested that average expenditure differentials 
between charter schools and TPS districts existed within each of the five general special education 
groupings after controlling for the intensive use of different types of special education services. A 
previous discussion proposed that different but more inexpensive services in charters might explain 
expenditure differentials within groups of special education students. Descriptive state level data 
lends some support to the assertion that special education service offerings were different in Arizona 
charter schools and TPS districts. However, these analyses have shown that the special education 
students enrolled in charter schools were less expensive than their counterparts enrolled in TPS 
districts even after accounting for differences in LEA special education service offerings.  
There was one noteworthy difference between the two sets of analyses.  The 
expense/disability severity measure in the GEE logistic “other disabilities” model was negative but 
non-significant. The HLM “other disabilities” models showed that charter schools generally enrolled 
less expensive students with other disabilities. The failure of the “other disabilities” GEE logistic 
model to show a statistically significant difference may suggest that the use of the empirical standard 
errors in the GEE context may have been overly stringent. It should also be pointed out that the 
two analyses are not strictly analogous since the outcome variables are different. 
 
                                                
11 HLM models were also estimated without the service mix use intensity variables for the purpose of 
comparison. They are not shown.  
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Table 4   
HLMs, Ln(total special education expense) for special education students in Arizona state, 2002-2003 
All             Disabilities Learning 
Disability 
Speech 
Impairment 
Severe   Disability Emotional 
Disability 
Other 
Disability Fixed Effect 
Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. 
Constant 2.86b 0.92 4.03d 1.01 1.06 1.34 -1.53 1.48 0.11 1.73 -1.59 1.90 
Charter School -2.79d 0.34 -2.60d 0.36 -2.30d 0.47 -2.36d 0.56 -2.90d 0.60 -2.24c 0.62 
Female 0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.05a 0.02 -0.002 0.07 0.04 0.04 0.15 0.12 
Black 0.07b 0.03 -0.02 0.02 0.08 0.05 0.02 0.14 -0.02 0.05 0.32 0.25 
Hispanic 0.03 0.02 -0.03a 0.02 0.004 0.03 0.07 0.10 0.002 0.04 0.12 0.16 
Native American 0.02 0.03 -0.03 0.02 -0.01 0.05 0.06 0.20 -0.11 0.08 -0.04 0.30 
Asian 0.11 0.07 0.05 0.05 -0.05 0.08 - - 0.19 0.14 0.64 0.43 
Other Ethnicity 0.18c 0.05 0.09b 0.03 0.03 0.12 0.20 0.26 0.09 0.10 0.95a 0.39 
Poverty Status -0.004 0.02 0.02 0.01 -0.05 0.03 0.13 0.12 0.06 0.05 0.22 0.18 
LEP 0.06b 0.02 0.03a 0.01 0.05 0.03 0.11 0.12 0.11 0.08 0.60b 0.21 
Ln(Dist. ADM) 0.58d 0.15 0.45b 0.16 0.69c 0.19 1.38d 0.24 1.08c 0.29 1.19d 0.31 
Urban District -0.27 0.30 -0.27 0.32 -0.19 0.36 0.33 0.35 -0.24 0.45 0.24 0.44 
Out of level 0.09d 0.02 -0.01 0.01 0.42d 0.03 0.25b 0.08 0.09b 0.03 0.06 0.12 
Mobile 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.05 0.03 -0.14 0.11 -0.01 0.03 -0.30 0.17 
% Service Type A 0.02c 0.004 0.02d 0.005 0.03b 0.01 - - - - - - 
% Service Type B - - - - 0.04c 0.01 - - - - - - 
% Service Type C - - - - - - - - 0.04a 0.02 - - 
% Service Type S - - - - - - -0.04d 0.01 - - - - 
Emot. disability 0.61d 0.02 - - - - - - - - - - 
Speech impairment 0.45d 0.02 - - - - - - - - - - 
Severe disability 0.73d 0.02 - - - - - - - - - - 
Other disability -0.73d 0.03 - - - - - - - - - - 
Random Effect Est. S.E. Est. S.E. Est. S.E. Est. S.E. Est. S.E. Est. S.E. 
Intercept u0j 5.75d 0.47 6.31d 0.51 5.18d 0.53 3.69d 0.55 7.84d 0.85 5.47d 0.80 
ICC 0.84 0.96 0.92 0.56 0.95 0.54 
-2LL 74,581.4 29,551.0 11,219.1 9,470.0 4,898.3 7,553.4 
n 25,138 18,622 4,879 2,332 2,109 1,648 
a p≤.05 b  p≤.01 c  p≤.001 d p≤.0001    
Conclusion 
The descriptive analyses assessed whether the profiles of the average special needs students 
attending charter schools and TPS districts differed. The results of the demographic analyses 
indicated that special education charter school students were disproportionately female, white, 
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Native American, and of some other race/ethnicity. A larger proportion of charter school special 
education students had an emotional disability. In contrast, special education students who attended 
a TPS district were disproportionately poorer, Hispanic, LEP, more expensive to serve, and more 
likely to have a speech impairment or severe disability. 
In light of the historical findings of McKinney (1996) and Garn (2000), the GEE logistic and 
HLM regression analyses of this study showed that it would be highly premature to rule out 
arguments suggesting that charter schools in Arizona restricted the enrollments of more severely 
disabled students intentionally, or unintentionally. While the effects of parental preference cannot be 
completely discounted, these findings considered as a whole suggested that average Arizona charter 
schools geared their educational services to a narrowly defined group of special education students 
in the 2002-03 academic year.  
Importantly, these results are not inconsistent with earlier findings from McKinney’s 1996 
study, and they could be taken as indirect evidence that average charter schools in Arizona during 
the 2002-2003 school year lacked administrators with specialized knowledge of disability law, 
facilities, or appropriate staff to properly address the needs of more severely disabled students. 
Clearly, one implication is that many parents could have been forced to enroll their more severely 
disabled special needs children in TPS districts. Alternatively, Arizona charter school admissions 
policies and educational missions may have been structured in ways that discouraged many parents 
from enrolling their more severely disabled children. Given the data limitations, it was not possible 
to ascertain if parents of the most severely disabled students voluntarily or involuntarily chose TPS 
districts over charters because appropriate services or enrollment barriers existed. Data from 
Arizona charter schools concerning the way services were implemented, the quality of those 
services, and the degree to which services met the needs of their respective students could be 
collected in a future study to determine the effect that they have on enrollment. 
Results also suggested that the intensive use of different types of special education services 
explains only a small part of the average student special education expenditure differential that 
existed between LEA types. Advocates for charter schools could be inclined to suggest that 
additional funding might be needed to induce charters to make their enrollment policies less 
restrictive to the most severely disabled students. Increased funding could be helpful if for instance, 
as Garn (2000) suggested, charter schools were required by the state to pick up the transportation 
costs of all special education students intent on attending a school. Currently, charter schools in 
Arizona are not mandated by legal statute to provide transport even though they receive a fixed 
amount for this purpose. Charter schools can refuse to pay for transportation, effectively eliminating 
choices for parents who cannot afford to pay privately. Additional funds could also induce charters 
to staff or equip their school facilities to better address the requirements of a variety of special 
education students creating less worry among parents who are unconvinced that a charter school can 
adequately provide services to their unique child. 
Such an approach does raise several questions, however. If the state gave additional per-
pupil funding for special education students solely to charter schools as an inducement to ease or 
eliminate enrollment barriers and improve services to the most severely disabled students, is this the 
most efficient use of resources? And does this suggest that charter schools might lack certain 
organizational and economic efficiencies more common to larger TPS districts in terms of the 
implementation of special education programs?  Changing special education funding formulas might 
be considered a rash action given that Chaikind et al. (1993) found that the costs of special 
education have remained fairly constant over time. Perhaps the ways in which charter schools 
allocate or choose not to allocate existing special education funds has an impact on enrollments as 
well. Sage policy makers in Arizona might reconsider the way special education funding is allocated 
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in addition to focusing more attention on how charter schools actually utilize special education 
funds. Parents of special education students could be surveyed regularly to determine how well 
LEAs follow the IEP process, the rationale used to choose the LEA their child attends, the quality 
and type of services offered, and whether they’ve experienced difficulty placing their child in specific 
LEAs and why. 
This study focused exclusively on special education students enrolled in Arizona TPS 
districts and charter schools.  As discussed earlier, the limited regulatory environment and strong 
political support for quasi-market style interventions in public education earmarked the state as 
somewhat distinct. Thus, the findings and conclusions drawn may have limited applicability in other 
states with large numbers of charter schools where regulatory environments are different. In other 
states that have less restrictive charter school laws where there is less fiscal oversight of special 
education spending in charter schools, similar attention to resource availability and allocation might 
be warranted to induce charter schools operators to provide more severely disabled students better 
access to alternative education opportunities. 
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Appendix 
Charter School Attendance—Students attending a charter school district received a one and TPS district 
students a zero. TPS districts were included in the contrast category.  
 
Gender—Female students received a one and males a zero. Male students served as the contrast 
category. 
 
LEP—Those students identified by a school as having LEP were assigned a one and a zero 
otherwise. Non-LEP students were included in the contrast group. 
 
Out of Level Test Takers—Students that had taken the AIMS exam at a different grade level other than 
the grade they were enrolled in were classified as out of level test takers. Such students were coded 
with a one. All others received a code of zero. On level test takers were included in the contrast 
category. 
 
Poverty Status—Each school identified the Title 1 status of their students. If the student had been 
coded with a “yes” for Title 1 status they received a code of one. All other students received a zero. 
Non-title 1 students were used as the contrast group. 
 
Student Mobility –An indicator for student mobility was also included in the multivariate analyses. 
Students indicated whether they had begun the school year in the school they were currently 
attending. Students who answered “no” to this question were given a code of one. All other received 
a zero. Non-movers were included in the contrast category. 
 
Race/Ethnicity—Constructed from a six-category indicator. Students were coded with a one if they 
met the condition and zero if they did not. The regression models included an indicator for Black, 
Asian, Native American, Hispanic and other racial/ethnic status. White students were used as the 
contrast group. 
 
County Location—A geographic indicator was included in each set of analyses. If the school or district 
was located in Maricopa or Pima County it was classified as urban. All other school/district 
locations were considered rural. The binary variable was coded one for urban and zero for rural. 
Districts/schools in rural county locations were included in the contrast group. 
 
District ADM—District ADM was computed as the (Σ of all schools’ ADM for each 
district)/(number of schools in the district). A monotonic transformation of this result - ln(District 
ADM) - was used as a proxy for the district’s size because the distribution was positively skewed. 
The state of Arizona defines ADM, “as the total enrollment of fractional students and full-time students, minus 
withdrawals, of each school day through the first one hundred days or two hundred days in session, as applicable, for 
the current year. Withdrawals include students formally withdrawn from schools and students absent for ten consecutive 
school days, except for excused absences as identified by the department of education. For computation purposes, the 
effective date of withdrawal shall be retroactive to the last day of actual attendance of the student.”  
 
Special Education Service Type—LEAs report the number of students receiving different types of 
special education services to the ADE. Of the twelve categories that can be reported, nearly 97% of 
special education students received services listed under four categories including: Service Type A—
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outside the regular class less than 21% of the day; Service Type B—outside the regular class for at 
least 21% but not more than 60% of the day; Service Type C—outside the regular class for more 
than 60% of the day; and Service Type S—regular class with supplemental aids/services. The 
proportion of students receiving each of these four types of special education services were 
computed for each LEA. 
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